News
Call for Papers, YARS 2018 vol. 11(18)
The Editorial Board of Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (YARS) kindly invites submissions of the papers that refer to law & economics of competition and sector-specific regulation for YARS 2018, vol. 11(18). YARS is a double peer-reviewed, open-access academic journal (see www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl), focusing on legal and economic issues of antitrust and regulation. YARS is published by the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (CARS) of the University of Warsaw since 2008. For more information please see the attached Call for Papers.
Seminar on Contractual Advantage on March 7, 2018
The Center for Antimonopoly and Regulatory Studies of the University of Warsaw (CARS) together with its partners cordially invites you to the Seminar entitled Challenges in commercial relations in the supply chain of food products after the Act on Contractual Advantage .
The seminar aims to assess the first effects of the act on counteracting the unfair use of contractual advantage in trade in agricultural and food products , which entered into force on July 12, 2017, and to analyze the possible legal and business consequences for the sector food and trade. The seminar will be held on March 7, 2018 at the Faculty of Management of the University of Warsaw (ul. Szturmowa 3, 02-678 Warsaw). Free admission. Please confirm your presence by February 28 by sending an email to
Scientific expertise: Applying competition and consumer protection rules against violations of anti-discrimination laws by companies
The scientific expertise was prepared by dr. Piotr Semeniuk, affiliated with CARS, for the Office of Ombudsman.
iKAR No. 1/2018 has just been published
iKAR No. 1/2018 has just been published. It is related to sector-specific regulation in the postal market. Its editor is Dr. Mateusz Chołodecki (WPiA UAM in Poznań) who is a head of CARS Postal Market Laboratory. The majority of texts in the volume are papers delivered at the 1st Polish Postal Conference „Postal Market in a Changing World” that took place at the Management Faculty of University of Warsaw on 28 September 2017.
Please feel free to have a look here
CARS scientific expertise: Expert opinion on the requirements concerning durable information medium in European Union and domestic legal provisions on payment services
The expert opinion prepared by prof. Stanisław Piątek investigates legal requirements concerning the activities of providers of payment services regarding the delivery of contractual information to clients on a “durable medium”. The opinion concerns the necessary functionality of internet website used as such durable medium.
(3) Maciej Bernatt, Maciej Janik, 'Judicial Review of Competition Law Decisions in Poland (2004-2021): A Quantitative and Qualitative Study', Working Paper of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, No. 1-2023
- Title: udicial Review of Competition Law Decisions in Poland (2004-2021): A Quantitative and Qualitative Study
- Publisher: Working Paper of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, No. 1-2023
- Place of publishing: Warsaw
- Year of publishing: 2023
- ISBN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4484063
Relying on the extensive analysis of a unique database of all available, 1196 Polish judgments rendered in appeal procedures against the decisions of the Polish competition authority (the UOKiK) applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or the national equivalent provisions, the present contribution reviews how the judicial review of antitrust enforcement action has developed in Poland since 2004. After presenting the Polish competition law enforcement system and describing a de novo character of judicial review in Poland, the paper presents the results of the quantitative analysis carried out on the basis of the data collected and coded in accordance with the parameters and calculation algorithms designed for the ECN+ Empirical Mapping Study. Among others, the data presented concern number of judgements according to instances, success rates and outcomes, types of substantive rules being appealed, the scope of fine reductions and admissibility criteria. Next, the qualitative analysis discusses how the intended characteristics of judicial review in Poland have actually manifested in judicial practice between 2004 and 2021. The paper shows that Poland’s experience with judicial review offers interesting lessons for other countries. It sits well between two extremes: a cassatory, legality focused model of judicial review, which tends to be formalistic and offering very limited space for the review of the substance of the competition authority’s decision, and an intrusive model of judicial review, where the determinations made by the competition authority have in practice little or no weight in proceedings before the review body. This is not to say that judicial review in Poland has no scope for improvement. The list includes, among others, challenges such as the length of judicial proceedings and its multilevel structure, limited expertise of judges and insufficient courts’ resources as well as the rule of law shortcomings in Poland.
(5) Maciej Bernatt, 'Politicization of Competition Agencies: In Search of an Analytical Framework Fit for Trump Era, Working Papers of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, No. 1-2025
- Title: Politicization of Competition Agencies: In Search of an Analytical Framework Fit for Trump Era
- Publisher: Working Papers of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, No. 1-2025
- Place of publishing: Warsaw
- Year of publishing: 2025
- ISBN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5375480
The paper proposes an analytical framework to examine the politicization of competition agencies. It aims to clarify how to distinguish between forms of politicization that can be perceived as neutral and those that pose systemic risks to these agencies. The paper explains that such risks arise when politicization involves the implementation of illiberal politics-that is, politics that reject key tenets of constitutional democracy and entail the arbitrary use of state economic powers-thereby undermining the rule-of-law-based character of competition law enforcement. The description of patterns of this impermissible politicization (referred to as the 'illiberal blueprint') is intended to help identify when red lines have been crossed. The illiberal blueprint includes, among other features, interference in the competition agency's decision-making processes, erosion of its independence, attrition of senior staff, restrictions on the scope of the agency's powers, politically motivated enforcement, self-restraint in cases involving politically connected firms, as well as political pressure on courts and judges. The paper draws on lessons from Hungary and Poland and compares them with recent developments in the U.S. since January 2025, particularly those involving the Federal Trade Commission. The article tentatively concludes that the patterns emerging in the U.S. today are not unique but align with those observed in other countries experiencing democratic backsliding and rule of law crisis.
The paper is available here.
(6) Piotr Oliński, Non-Economic Goals of Competition Law in the Light of the European Union’s Economic Constitution: in Search for the Axiological Framework
- Title: Non-Economic Goals of Competition Law in the Light of the European Union’s Economic Constitution: in Search for the Axiological Framework
- Publisher: Working Papers of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, No. 2-2025
- Place of publishing: Warsaw
- Year of publishing: 2025
- ISBN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5400157
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the social market economy has been established as an objective of the EU internal market. It is also rooted in the constitutions and constitutional traditions of several Member States. This article interprets the concept of the social market economy as the economic constitution of the European Union, following the methodology developed by the Freiburg School of Law and Economics. According to this approach, all economic policy decisions should align with the chosen economic order. This interpretation is presented in light of underdeveloped jurisprudence and limited doctrinal contributions, revealing gaps in both legal scholarship and case law. The article explores the objectives and limits of competition law within the framework of the EU’s economic constitution. It then applies this framework to ongoing debates about broadening the aims of competition law beyond the traditional focus on economic efficiency. The article discusses potential justifications for including broader public interest considerations in competition law, as well as their limits. It argues that the concept of the economic constitution can serve as a valuable analytical tool for addressing contemporary challenges in competition law and policy.
The paper is available here.
(4) Maciej Bernatt, 'Democracy and Competition Law: Exploring Substantive and Procedural Links', Working Paper of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, No. 1-2024 (3)
Against the backdrop of processes of democratic backsliding materializing in many countries in the world, the paper addresses the question about a pro-democratic role of competition law. Relying on the existing case-law, the paper distinguishes the substantive and the procedural dimensions of competition law-democracy link, and it explains that competition can play a pro-democratic role if rule of law is safeguarded. The substantive dimension of competition law-democracy link is related, first, to the competition law's role to provide a check on the use of market power by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms present on the markets where economic and political power is intermingled. Second, the substantive dimension is about competition law's role to safeguard that private firms, in particular digital platforms and media companies, give consumers an access to diverse sources of information (pluralism). Third, it is about competition law's role to promote socioeconomic and environmental values once they are enshrined in national constitutions. As far as a procedural dimension of competition law-democracy link is concerned, the paper explains that it is related to rule of law as a key democratic value. In particular, the institutional organization and procedures in competition law aim at safeguarding rule of law so as decision-making of competition authorities and courts is protected against political pressure and capture by private interest. The paper has the following structure. First, it explains that despite the disagreement about what exact goals competition law serves, it can be understood as an area of law which has an important public interest role to play which may include a pro-democratic role. Second, it analyzes the substantive and procedural links between competition law and democracy. Third, it discusses substantive and procedural links between competition law and democracy in practice. Two media merger transactions which were subject to review by Polish competition authority and courts are analyzed in this respect as an illustration.
(7) Antoni Napieralski, Between Procedural Autonomy and Sincere Cooperation. Understanding the Self-Citation Practice of the Court of Justice of the EU
The article examines how the principle of procedural autonomy was introduced and then incrementally modified by the Court of Justice of the EU through its self-citation practice. Doctrinal analysis of the jurisprudence of the CJEU is combined with evidence-based methods. Three conclusions are drawn. First, that the principle of procedural autonomy is anchored in the principle of sincere cooperation. Further, that the principle of procedural autonomy was introduced to the case law in 1998, by means of a silent, incremental change of a self-citation. Finally, that procedural autonomy was linked by the CJEU to the 1976 Rewe judgment, which is silent on procedural autonomy. Accordingly, this article argues that procedural autonomy should be read not as Member States' safe harbour, but as Member States' duty to ensure effective enforcement of EU law.
The article is available here.
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